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Abstract: We correct an omission in the definition of our domain of weakly responsive pref-
erences introduced in Klaus and Klijn (2005) or KK05 for short. The proof of the existence of
stable matchings (KK05, Theorem 3.3) and a maximal domain result (KK05, Theorem 3.5) are
adjusted accordingly.
Keywords: Matching; Couples; Weak Responsiveness; Stability
JEL classification: C78; J41
1 Introduction
In a recent paper Nakamura (2005, Example 1) shows that the weak responsiveness condition
of KK05 is not sufficient to ensure stability. Two results in KK05 are affected by the omission
Nakamura detected in our definition of weak responsiveness, namely Theorems 3.3 and 3.5. In
this corrigendum we add a small extra condition to our definition of weak responsiveness that
is in line with our intuitive motivation and description of weak responsiveness as presented in
KK05. We also provide short adjustments of the proofs of KK05’s Theorems 3.3 and 3.5.
Nakamura (2005) introduces a logically equivalent adjustment of weak responsiveness (called
reasonable responsiveness) and reformulates KK05’s Theorems 3.3 and 3.5 as new results (Naka-
mura, 2005, Theorems 1 and 2). Nakamura’s adjusted proof of KK05’s Theorem 3.5 is different
from the proof we present here.
2 Corrections: Weak Responsiveness and Domain Maximality
In order to exclude that for a couple two undesirable positions are combined to a desirable
allotment, we add condition (iii) to our KK05 definition of weak responsiveness.
Weakly responsive preferences: Couple c = (sk, sl) has weakly responsive preferences if
there exist preferences ºsk and ºsl such that
(i) for all h ∈ H,
(u, h) Âc (u, u) if and only if h Âsl u,
(h, u) Âc (u, u) if and only if h Âsk u,
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(ii) for all hp, hq, hr ∈ H ∪ {u},
[hpºsku, hqºslu, and hpÂskhr imply (hp, hq)Âc(hr, hq)] and
[hpºslu, hqºsku, and hpÂslhr imply (hq, hp)Âc(hq, hr)], and
(iii) for all h′, h′′ ∈ H, h′ 6= h′′, uºskh′ and uºslh′′ imply (u, u) Âc (h′, h′′).
Nakamura (2005) showed that KK05’s Theorem 3.3 is not true without the omitted condition
(iii). When introducing weak responsiveness in KK05 we explained (see KK05, page 82, lines
9-12) that “The idea of this extension [i.e., from responsiveness to weak responsiveness] is that
the exact associated preferences that deal with the comparison of unacceptable positions are
irrelevant with respect to stability since an agent can always replace any unacceptable position
with unemployment.” Without condition (iii), the only case where the agents in a couple may
not want to replace their unacceptable positions by unemployment occurs when the combination
of them is acceptable – a case that is now excluded by (iii). We would like to emphasize that
since condition (iii) is still in line with our intuition that motivated weak responsiveness, we do
not find it necessary to change our nomenclature. Our corrected weak responsiveness is logically
equivalent to Nakamura’s (2005) “reasonable responsiveness” condition.1
With the corrected notion of weak responsiveness KK05’s Theorem 3.3 is correct and the
adjustment of the proof minimal.
KK05’s Theorem 3.3 (Stability for weakly responsive preferences)
Let (PH , PC) be a couples market where couples have weakly responsive preferences. Then,
any matching that is stable for an associated singles market (PH , PS(PC)) is also stable for
(PH , PC). In particular, there exists a stable matching for (PH , PC).
Proof. The first 13 lines of the proof are identical to the proof of Theorem 3.3 in KK05. Then
the next two lines should be adjusted as follows (the change is marked in bold face).
“ Assume hp ≺sk u and hq ≺sl u. Then by weak responsiveness (iii), (u,u) Âc (hp,hq).
Using . . . ”
The remaining part of the proof is identical to the proof of Theorem 3.3 in KK05. 2
Also KK05’s Theorem 3.5 is correct with the corrected notion of weak responsiveness. The
adjustment of the proof is minimal by adding an extra case that deals separately with a violation
of weak responsiveness condition (iii). We also add a case to the proof that we forgot to deal
with when condition (ii) is violated. Changes in the proof are again indicated in bold face.
KK05’s Theorem 3.5 (Maximal Domain I)
For couples markets with restricted strictly unemployment averse couples, the domain of weakly
responsive preferences is a maximal domain for the existence of stable matchings.
Proof. We prove the theorem by constructing a counter example for each possible violation
of weak responsiveness. Assume that couple c1 = (s1, s2)’s preferences are restricted strictly
unemployment averse, but not weakly responsive. Consider ºs1 and ºs2 satisfying weak re-
sponsiveness condition (i) (note that such preferences always exist). Since couple c1’s
preferences are not weakly responsive, ºs1 and ºs2 do not satisfy weak responsiveness condi-
tions [(ii) and (iii)], i.e., [not (ii)] or [not (iii)].
1Our correction of the weak responsiveness condition allows for a short and straightforward adjustment of the
proofs, in particular the proof of KK05’s Theorem 3.5.
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Case (a): Suppose condition (ii) is violated.
First, assume that the violation of (ii) is such that there exist hp, hq, hr ∈ H ∪ {u}
such that (1) [hpºs1u, hqºs2u, and hpºs1uÂs1hr imply (hr, hq)Âc1(hp, hq)] or (2) [hpºs2u,
hqºs1u, and hpºs2uÂs2hr imply (hq, hr)Âc1(hq, hp)].
Without loss of generality assume (1). Then, by restricted strict unemployment
aversion, (hp, hq)ºc(u, hq)ºc(u, u). Furthermore, since uÂs1hr, (u, u)Âc1(hr, u). Hence,
(hr, hq)Âc1(hr, u) and hr, hq ∈ H.
Now, for hr, hq and h ∈ H\{hr, hq} we specify P (hr) = s1, s3, ∅, . . ., P (hq) = s3, s2, ∅, . . .,
and P (h) = ∅, . . .. Couple c2 = (s3, s4) has restricted strictly unemployment averse
responsive preferences based on P (s3) = hr, hq, u, . . . and P (s4) = u, . . .. Note that for
any individually rational matching µ, µ(c2) ∈ {(hr, u), (hq, u), (u, u)}. Assume that µ
is stable. If µ(c2) = (u, u), then µ is blocked by (c2, (hq, u)). If µ(c2) = (hq, u), then
µ(c1) = (u, u). Hence, µ is blocked by (c2, (hr, u)). If µ(c2) = (hr, u), then µ(c1) = (u, hq)
(by restricted strict unemployment aversion, (u, hq)ºc1(u, u)). Hence, µ is blocked
by (c1, (hr, hq)). Thus all candidates for a stable matching are blocked.
Second, assume that the violation of (ii) involves neither uÂs1hr nor uÂs2hr.
Then, it follows that . . . The remainder of this part of the proof is as in KK05, p. 85, line 23 –
p. 86, line 28.
Case (b): Suppose condition (iii) is violated.
Then, there exist h′, h′′ ∈ H, h′ 6= h′′, such that uºs1h′, uºs2h′′, and (h′, h′′) Âc1 (u, u).
Now, for h′, h′′ and h ∈ H\{h′, h′′} we specify P (h′) = s1, s3, ∅, . . ., P (h′′) = s3, s2, ∅, . . .,
and P (h) = ∅, . . .. Couple c2 = (s3, s4) has restricted strictly unemployment averse
responsive preferences based on P (s3) = h′, h′′, u, . . . and P (s4) = u, . . .. Note that for
any individually rational matching µ, µ(c2) ∈ {(h′, u), (h′′, u), (u, u)}. Assume that µ
is stable. Then, µ(c1) ∈ {(h′, h′′), (u, u)}. If µ(c2) = (u, u), then µ is be blocked by
(c2, (h′′, u)). If µ(c2) = (h′′, u), then µ(c1) = (u, u). Hence, µ is blocked by (c2, (h′, u)).
If µ(c2) = (h′, u), then µ is blocked by (c1, (h′, h′′)). Thus all candidates for a stable
matching are blocked. 2
The added Case (b) in the proof of Theorem 3.5 also provides a simple example that
weak responsiveness condition (iii) is a necessary condition for stability. In contrast to Naka-
mura’s (2005) Example 1, we only utilize two hospitals and only one violation of condition (iii)
[in Nakamura’s Example 1 four hospitals are needed and two couples preferences are in violation
of weak responsiveness condition (iii)].2
References
[1] B. Klaus and F. Klijn, Stable matchings and preferences of couples, Journal of Economic
Theory 121 (2005), 75-106.
[2] T. Nakamura, A simple example of instability and a new condition for stability in matching
with couples, Working paper (2005).
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